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BACK TO BASICS
Research Design for the Operational Level of War
Margaret M. Polski

T

he current competitive environment creates new imperatives in the Navy to
sharpen our research skills and expand the range of methods we use to investigate questions about warfare and the Navy enterprise. The call to innovate has
given rise to a number of very thoughtful critiques and suggestions.1 For example,
there is renewed interest within the Navy in using wargaming, game theory, and
experimentation to illuminate war-fighting challenges.2 However, none of these
critiques or suggestions takes into consideration the nature of the research challenge or research standards.
Sometimes the use of particular research methods is promoted without understanding why analysts choose to use one method versus another or how to use each
one most effectively to achieve particular objecMargaret M. Polski earned a doctorate in political
science at Indiana University under the supervision
tives.3 As many in the war-fighting research comof Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom. Her methodologimunity are quick to point out, well-intended but
cal concentrations included game theory and experimental design, and she did postdoctoral work in overzealous analytical enthusiasms often lead to
cognitive neuroscience and computational social sci- inefficient investment and disappointment, which
ence. Prior to joining the Naval War College faculty,
inevitably generate critiques and calls for reform.
Dr. Polski provided technical assistance to address a
In the worst case, a misguided analysis is used to
wide range of national security challenges at home
and abroad, supporting defense, diplomacy, devel- support decisions that have tragic outcomes.
opment, homeland security, and law-enforcement
Innovating and expanding the range of methods
missions. She is a research fellow in the Krasnow
Institute for Advanced Study at George Mason Uni- we use to understand war fighting are a good idea—
versity, serves as a panel reviewer for the National
provided they are informed by a clear understandScience Foundation, and coleads a NATO systems
ing of our objectives and research-performance
analysis study research task group on innovation in
analytical wargaming.
criteria. However, in its review of joint professional military education research institutions,
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that the Department of Defense (DoD) does not have criteria to assess research
performance.4 The results of a 2017 workshop on the Navy’s operations research
enterprise suggest that the Navy shares this challenge.5
The purpose of this article is to provide a starting point for addressing the
military research-performance criteria gap by examining the nature of war
fighting as a research challenge in the context of professional research standards
and exploring how we could better assess, select, and evaluate methods.6 The
first section analyzes the nature of war fighting as a research challenge and the
implications for designing and evaluating research. The second section provides
an overview of research design and the role of professional research standards in
selecting methods and evaluating findings. The third and fourth sections analyze
the strengths and limitations of wargaming, experimentation, and game theory
against criteria that emerge from the analyses in sections 1 and 2. The final section concludes by offering suggestions for improving our research practices.
THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE
With regard to analyzing warfare, the Navy (and the military more generally)
has two challenges, which often are conflated. One challenge is to understand
the nature of warfare as it evolves and how to fight, which informs the full range
of the Title 10 concerns of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The other is
to educate current and future warfighters, which primarily informs the CNO’s
responsibility to organize, man, and train Navy forces.7
The first challenge involves ensuring that we design and conduct high-quality
investigations that advance knowledge and inform everyday decision-making.
The second is a pedagogical challenge that involves ensuring that our teaching
methods achieve our learning objectives. If we wish to select the best methods for
war-fighting research, we must be clear from the outset about the nature of the
research challenge, which requires specifying the level of analysis, the nature or
context of war fighting, and the questions we wish to investigate.
Specification
Joint doctrine provides a starting point for considering a broad range of military
research questions at multiple levels of analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the levels of
warfare. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1) defines warfare
as “the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy. It
is the ‘how’ of waging war.”8 While most of the Navy’s war-fighting challenges
have implications at all levels of analysis, to craft a rigorous and coherent research
design one must focus on a particular level of analysis. For the purpose of discussion, this article narrows its analysis to one of the Navy’s three primary missions:
how we can be ready to fight (and win) in a specific area of responsibility (AOR).
This is a research question at the operational level of warfare.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6
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FIGURE 1
LEVELS OF WARFARE
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Source: U.S. Defense Dept., Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, fig. 1-2.

One way to specify the operational level of war fighting in an AOR is as a
Figure 1
series of strategic interactions. In this specification, the term strategic interaction
Levels of Warfare
does not pertain to the strategic level of warfare but rather to a type of behavior
in which
participants
interacting in1.0,
a system
attempt to anticipate each other’s
Source:
Joint Publication
fig. 1−2
preferences, decisions, and actions/reactions; formulate perceptions and beliefs
about the behavior of other participants, on the basis of available information or
past experience; and make decisions about their own actions on the basis of their
perceptions and beliefs about the other participants’ actions/reactions.
War fighting is a strategic interaction because two or more units are engaged
in some form of rivalry, the scope of which may include a range of strategic
behavior, from cooperation to competition to full-scale conflict. The focus of a
research investigation is on some aspect of the behavior and effects of war fighting: the decisions that warfighters make; the signals they produce; the processes
and capabilities they employ; the effects of inputs to decision-making, such as
information, beliefs, and incentives to act; the costs, benefits, risks, and effects of
the choices that warfighters make; and so on.
The next step is to specify the context of operational-level war-fighting decision behavior. Many war-fighting behaviors emerge from a complex, adaptive
system of physical and social systems. Complexity has a number of implications
for designing and conducting research on strategic interaction.9 In operations
research, decision-making challenges associated with complexity are called
“wicked challenges.” Wicked challenges cannot be formulated definitively; they
have neither a well-defined set of right-or-wrong solutions nor a well-described
set of permissible operations; discrepancies can be explained in many different
ways; and there is no immediate or ultimate test of a solution. While developing
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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war-fighting capabilities involves bench science, engineering, and social science,
war fighting involves behavioral challenges that cannot be solved or addressed
by science or probabilistic mathematics alone. This means that it is inherently
a fuzzy rather than a formal logic challenge, which requires methods and tools
that allow us to deal with vagueness and classification issues in a systematic and
tractable way.10
If we wish to investigate decision-making questions at the operational level of
warfare, we should employ research methods that are useful for analyzing strategic decision behavior in complex adaptive systems. To do this, we need to specify
what we mean by complexity, and its implications for research design.
Complex Adaptive Systems
Research questions that involve complicated systems, such as determining the
range of a missile or a torpedo, may be complicated—but they are not wicked.
They have knowable parameters and a small number of potential outcomes, and
with the right set of methods one can generate estimates within a set of confidence intervals. But questions related to decision-making in complex adaptive
systems, such as deciding whether to launch a missile or a torpedo or where to
target weapons, have fuzzy parameters and a potentially large number of alternative courses of action and outcomes. We may be able to observe patterns in the
behaviors that emerge from complex adaptive systems, but we cannot eliminate
the possibility that these patterns are transitory or extraneous. Hence, we may not
be able to generate reliable estimates.
Similarly, we may find correlations in the behavior of components of complex
adaptive systems, but it may not be possible to accumulate evidence that demonstrates causal relations. For example, warfighters can and do change the nature
of a rivalry by manipulating factors related to time, space, and force. Variables
include the types of participants; functions and enablers, such as command
and control, intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver, position, cyber, and other
assets or capabilities in their AOR; the scope of permissible action and rules of
engagement; the enforcement of rules; and the imposition of costs and benefits.
Warfighters make decisions or take actions on the basis of an estimate of who or
what their adversaries and allies are at any given point in time and what actions
those adversaries and allies have taken or will take. Hence, to understand the
behavior of one warfighter, one must understand the behavior of others within
the relevant war-fighting environment, which may extend beyond the immediate AOR.
Behavior that emerges from complex adaptive systems can be differentiated
from behavior in complicated systems in a number of ways. First, behavior is selforganizing and exhibits both deliberate and spontaneous order. Self-organizing
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behavior occurs without explicit command or control and depends on locally
operating social and technical processes, which may be quite difficult to observe.
Second, the structure of complex adaptive behavior is distributed—or, more
specifically, is polycentric—and it is multiscale. We can expect to find more than
one center of decision-making and control, which means that a single, hierarchical form of command and control does not govern the system, even though some
subsystems may be centralized or decentralized hierarchies. Multiscale behavior
cannot be described by a single rule or analyzed at a single level; the structure of
behavior exists on multiple scales and multiple levels.
Finally, while complex adaptive systems are sensitive to initial conditions,
they often exhibit contradictory behavior. We may find path dependencies and
stable equilibrium; however, these systems are ultimately dynamic, and we also
can expect to find punctuated equilibrium, “black swans,” interdependencies,
and nonlinearity.
It is extremely challenging to comprehend complex adaptive systems. If we
wish to understand the behavior that emerges from these systems, we must be
very careful in how we design and evaluate research.
RESEARCH DESIGN
As figure 2 shows, research design begins by specifying a purpose and objective(s)
for the work. Objectives drive research design, which includes reviewing prior research, then selecting approaches, methods, and tools to conduct research. The
ultimate test of research findings is the extent to which they meet research objectives, contribute to producing knowledge that is supported by facts and logical
reasoning, or clarify the limits of knowledge.
FIGURE 2
THE FOUNDATIONS OF WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH DESIGN

Purpose

Objectives
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The objective of operational-level war-fighting research may be to create or
contribute to a body of basic research or applied research. For example, a basicresearch project on operational-level war fighting could involve trying to develop
or test theories about enduring questions, such as why adversaries fight, how
certain types of conflict end, or which signaling behaviors are associated with
particular types of operations. Findings could contribute to advancing general
knowledge about war fighting by providing evidence that either supports or does
not support theories about the challenge.
By contrast, an applied-research project could involve identifying the functions and enablers that are required to support an operational concept in a particular AOR under a specific set of conditions. It may or may not test theories about
an operational challenge, but it could inform operational planning. The findings
could help senior leaders and planners better understand the implications of
using the operational concept that is being investigated in a specific context at a
particular moment in time.
Once the objectives of research are determined, the principles that guide research design and execution are quite similar. The overarching goal of research is
to produce findings that have inferential value for other researchers, educators,
and practitioners. However, this can pose a challenge for research design. Professional research communities have expertise in research design. They impose
stringent requirements for inferential value because society entrusts them to both
build the stock of knowledge and guard the integrity of this stock. In contrast,
practitioners might not have expertise in research design and they might accept
less-stringent requirements for inferential value because they are not charged
with building or guarding the stock of knowledge. Researchers must take these
differences into consideration when they design research and share it with others.
War-fighting challenges cross disciplines, and research-design practices can
vary across disciplines and research groups. For example, understanding the
effects of hitting a target with a missile involves a grasp of knowledge that researchers accumulate in physics, chemistry, material sciences, engineering, social
sciences such as psychology and political economy, and so on. However, professional researchers, regardless of their disciplines, are trained to think about their
work in the context of normal science and to use some version of the scientific
method in the way they design and conduct their research.11 Table 1 lists the
generally accepted steps in research design.
The aim of research design is to produce findings that will contribute to a
stock of accumulated knowledge. This may involve testing an existing theory
about a research challenge or developing a new theory. A peer-review process
determines whether research findings will be added to the official stock. While
peer reviews are notoriously idiosyncratic, the research communities do have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6
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TABLE 1
STEPS IN PROFESSIONAL RESEARCH DESIGN
Step

Activity

Issues/Questions

1

Specify an interesting purpose
and objectives

What do we need to address to advance the stock of knowledge, such that
it has broader impact?

2

Survey the scholarly and empirical research literature

What do we know about the issues associated with our purpose and
objectives, and how strong is the evidence? That is, what are existing
theories (i.e., reasoned and logically consistent speculations about the
answers to research questions) about our research challenge? What is the
evidence that supports these theories? How extensive is the empirical
support? How rigorous is the support?

3

Formulate research questions
as hypotheses and develop a
detailed plan to investigate or
test the degree of support for the
hypotheses

Which data can we realistically collect to test theory?a How will we
collect, structure, record, and archive the data we collect? How will we
analyze data? Analytical questions focus on evaluating alternative testing
methods to identify the one that best fits our research objectives and the
type of data we are able to collect.b

4

Conduct the research

How can we use data and conduct analyses to generate inferences that are
unbiased by error? How can we increase leverage while minimizing the
information used for description or inference?

5

Disseminate research results

Research conducted to advance the stock of public knowledge is submitted for peer review and published as widely as possible in scholarly and
other public media. Research conducted to advance a private stock of
knowledge also should be peer-reviewed and disseminated as widely as
possible within the constraints of the research tasking.

Notes:
a. Data may be quantitative (amounts or quantities, in the form of numbers or proportions) or qualitative (in the form of characteristics or qualities).
b. Mathematical, statistical, and machine-learning methods, which typically are called quantitative methods, require quantitative data. By contrast, qualitative methods, such as histories, case studies, and interviews, rely on qualitative data.

standard operating practices, which aim to assess and enforce rigor. Measures of
rigor relate to validity, or the extent to which the way research is designed and
carried out generates findings that actually measure what the researcher intended
to measure; reliability, which refers to whether the researcher’s measuring procedure, used in the same way, will produce the same measure; and replicability, or
the extent to which another equally capable researcher could duplicate an analysis using the same data and reach the same conclusions.12
Other professional research standards include taking steps to minimize bias
and error in research procedures and ensuring, to the extent possible, that research procedures are parsimonious (explaining as simply as possible, with as
little extraneous detail as possible). Finally, researchers are expected to be humble
and to share their knowledge. All knowledge and all inference have limits; the
best researchers are collegial skeptics who are able and willing to ask about the
relevance of data, the appropriateness of research and analytical procedures, and
the possibility of alternative explanations for inferences. They disseminate their
research findings widely, in accessible ways, to stimulate and accelerate knowledge production.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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METHODS
Research design includes surveying research methods and selecting the one best
suited to achieving research objectives. Recently the Navy research community
has been reconsidering three methods to investigate questions about decisions
and interactions in war fighting: wargaming, experimentation, and game theory.
This section provides an overview of these methods, and the following section
evaluates them against the criteria discussed in the preceding sections.
Wargaming
The Navy has employed wargaming as a method for investigating war fighting
since at least 1887.13 The Navy’s use of wargaming has been shaped indelibly by
the work of Captain William McCarty Little, Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, and
Francis McHugh. These early researchers developed wargaming at the Naval War
College over a period that spanned the founding of the College, the interwar period, and the Cold War era. McCarty Little is credited with introducing wargaming into the Naval War College in 1887, and he wrote a number of papers on the
subject.14 Van Auken was hired to stand up a research department at the College
in 1932 to document and analyze wargame findings.15 However, it is McHugh
who is associated most closely with developing the disciplined and systematic
methodological approach to using wargames to analyze war fighting that the
College’s War Gaming Department (NWC WGD) uses today.16
McHugh, incorporating McCarty Little’s work, defined wargaming as follows:
“A war game is a simulation, in accordance with pre-determined rules, data, and
procedures, of selected aspects of a conflict situation. It is an artificial—or more
strictly, a theoretical—conflict . . . to afford a practice field for the acquirement of
skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and
trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans.”17
Today, the NWC WGD conducts wargames for the senior leadership of the
Navy, primarily at the operational level of war in the context of great-power
competition. Wargaming is a systematic method for experiencing the effects of
war-fighting decisions and analyzing decision behavior. A wargame is a representation of a war-fighting decision-making dilemma—a representation that may or
may not conform to what we can or will observe in the naturally occurring world.
It is a representation of a real war fight, in the sense that players are actually playing the game, and hence engaging in decision-making related to war fighting.
Disciplined wargamers begin with a decision challenge, specify their research
objective(s), and then design an experience that will illuminate the decision in
such a way that they will achieve these objectives.18
In a typical wargame, players (individuals or groups with experience or responsibilities that are relevant to the decision challenge) are recruited to play the
game in teams. Individuals who are not involved directly in playing the game act
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6
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as facilitators, adjudicators, data collectors, and analysts. Individuals are selected
to participate on the basis of their expertise and understanding of the decision
context. For example, if a researcher or research sponsor wishes to investigate
the strengths and limitations of a concept of operations (CONOPS), the validity
and reliability of the findings from game play depend to a great extent on how
knowledgeable the participants are about the operating environment and the
capabilities that the CONOPS requires them to employ. In other words, experienced warfighters should be asked to fight using the CONOPS and all their
acquired knowledge and skill. Typically, none of the participants in a game is
selected or assigned randomly.
Players and other participants are provided with scene setters, an environment
in an operating area, and scenarios, which create a decision-making context and
provide them with rules of engagement, resources, capabilities, and limitations.
Games may be designed to represent conflict between two opposing units (twosided) or among multiple teams, which may be allied or opposed (multisided).19
The main point is that the game pits players against a rival or adversary. Participants may use computers in their play; manually manipulate assets and forces
on a board; or deliberate, record, and convey their decisions in a seminar or
workshop-style format.
Another group of participants controls the play of the game and adjudicates
the effects of the decisions that players make. At the end of the game, players
discuss the game experience, including the logic they used in playing the game,
the challenges they encountered, and so on. Game play—including facilitation
and after-action discussion—is observed and recorded by a data collection and
analysis team. Following the conclusion of the game, the team organizes gameplay data; conducts analysis against a predetermined set of research questions,
using qualitative and quantitative methods; reports on findings; and archives all
game material.
The NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design process that
includes the steps that are typical in professional research design, which are
modified to accommodate the Navy’s requirements for wargaming.20 The WGD’s
current wargame-research process, which is depicted in figure 3, includes specifying the challenge, purpose, and objectives of wargame research; conducting
a literature review and articulating research questions; developing a research
design that includes a data-collection and -analysis plan; designing and testing a
game to achieve research objectives and address research questions; developing
and testing the game; executing the game; conducting analysis; writing a report,
which is peer-reviewed and disseminated to an approved audience; and archiving
game artifacts. This disciplined process makes it possible to replicate the game,
repeat the game, or iterate on some aspect of the game.21
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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FIGURE 3
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WARGAME RESEARCH-DESIGN PROCESS
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Source: Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook.

The fact that the NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design
process does not guarantee the quality or inferential value of its research prodFigure 3
ucts. As in any research enterprise, the research process may not be implemented
Naval War College Wargame Research-Design Process
perfectly at all times, researchers in the department may not always have the skills
or tools they need at the time they need them to conduct rigorous research for
Source: Burns, ed., War Gamers’ Handbook
particular challenges, and those who direct research tasking may wish to sacrifice
analytical rigor to achieve other objectives.
NWC WGD wargaming research is conducted at classified levels and added
to stocks of knowledge that the Navy and DoD maintain. The department’s
wargames are peer-reviewed by other wargamers and decision analysts who are
engaged in developing and evaluating war-fighting concepts and plans. Wargaming is used in civilian research and learning and reported in publicly accessible
scholarly research on conflict and decision behavior. There are many trade press
publications on wargaming; however, few address it in the context of professional
research criteria.
Experimentation
Most of us intuitively search for associations and causal relationships to explain
and improve on our experience, and often we engage in a process of trial and error to arrive at a useful solution to a challenge. However, trial and error is a costly
approach. The Navy has employed experimentation to identify a range of useful
solutions to war-fighting challenges at the operational level of warfare.22 Formal
experiments test the influence of one or a small number of causes of observed
effects.23 Researchers articulate a specific theory of cause and effect, take an action consistent with their theory (a treatment), attempt to control for extraneous
influences that could limit or bias the hypothetical causal relationship, and systematically observe and record the effects of the manipulation.
Some analysts associate experimentation with the physical sciences and a
tightly controlled laboratory environment. However, the experimental method
is used in every discipline, and a number of different types of experiments have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6
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been developed over time to address variation in research challenges and analytical settings.24 Experiments and experimental frameworks are a well-described
component of military operations research. Richard A. Kass, the Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), and the Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC)
have published detailed, practical guides on war-fighting experimentation.25 All
three of these guides categorize analytical wargaming as a type of experimental
method. Experiments also are used in the social and computational sciences,
which are the scholarly disciplines that address basic and applied decisionmaking challenges. Moreover, both wargaming and game-theoretic approaches
can be used in combination with experimentation.26
All experiments consist of four elements: (1) units or persons, (2) treatments,
(3) observations or outcomes, and (4) settings. Experiments are designed to
understand a theory or hypothesis about a causal relationship among these elements. They answer the question: If we do x to y in a particular setting s, will z
occur? Experimental design involves specifying and operationalizing proxies for
x, y, s, and z and developing a set of protocols for organizing and running the
experiment that will reduce bias and minimize threats to validity. Experimental
protocols address the assignment of units or persons to experimental conditions,
measurement of observations or outcomes, comparison groups, and treatment.
Kass, TTCP, and NWDC identify four requirements for a war-fighting experiment to have inferential value.27 First, the experiment must provide the ability
to use the hypothetical concept or capability. Second, the experimental environment must be structured in such a way that the experimentalist can observe an
effect from using the hypothetical element. Third, the experimental environment
and procedures must permit the experimentalist to isolate the reason for the
observed effect. And finally, the experimental findings must relate to a real warfighting challenge.
Experimentation is an appealing approach to investigating war-fighting challenges because it has the potential to provide evidence about causal variables,
which can be used to build knowledge about how to fight. The weakness of the
approach is the extent to which causal inferences can be generalized beyond the
experimental conditions to explain a broader class of similar war-fighting challenges. Generalization challenges in war-fighting experimentation are related to
validity and they are intrinsic to the practical limits on designing and implementing war-fighting experiments.
For example, most war-fighting challenges are necessarily local and particular.
They occur in a restricted range of settings, which may or may not be replicable or
repeatable, and with a particular version of one type of war-fighting “treatment”
rather than all possible versions. Usually they have several different effectiveness measures—each with theoretical assumptions that are different from those
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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associated with other measures—but not a complete set of all possible measures.
Moreover, warfare often is conducted with a convenient sample of warfighters
rather than one that reflects a well-described population, and it is conducted at
a particular moment in time that soon becomes history. Each of these aspects of
war fighting poses a challenge for using the findings from experimentation to
answer general classes of war-fighting questions or challenges.
All research methods in the decision sciences and operations research have
generalization issues. Yet we are not likely to abandon our quest to understand
how things work in complex field settings or how we can improve the inferential
value of our research findings. The mitigation strategies we use to address threats
to validity depend on the type of validity challenge we confront. Kass, TTCP, and
NWDC enumerate twenty-one threats to validity in war-fighting experiments
and provide a catalog of techniques and procedures for improving validity.
Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical approach to developing and testing theories of
decision challenges that involve conflicts of interest. While it has been used to
analyze strategic interactions that may occur in a war-fighting context, it is not
per se a method for investigating war fighting or any other strategic interaction
at an operational level. Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein provide the following definition of game theory, games, and game-theoretic solutions. “Game
theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena
that we observe when decision-makers interact. . . . A game is a description of
strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players
can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players
do take. A solution is a systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge
in a family of games.”28
One way to think about a game-theoretic analysis is as a systematic thought
experiment that follows formal mathematical rules. It is an abstract representation of a particular interaction or class of interactions, which may or may not
conform to real life. Decision makers do not play a game-theoretic analysis; a
game theorist designs, “plays,” analyzes, and reports on the game. The game environment is an idealized choice context, “players” are mathematical operations,
and the game does not provide the opportunity to engage in or experience the
effects of decision-making.
The research-design process for a game theorist is focused principally on
specifying an interesting decision challenge and assumptions about decisionmaking, finding or developing an appropriate solution concept, and constructing
a mathematical proof of the concept. The esoteric nature of the method dictates
the research objective; it is an analytical exercise that is abstracted from a physical
and social operating environment. While game theorists often motivate or impel
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6
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their models with a stylized description of a specific operational challenge, they
aim deliberately for a sparse context so they can identify strategies that mathematically dominate other strategies for the interaction of interest. However, the
product of the research—namely, the game-theoretic model—may be, and often
is, tested empirically in richer environments using other research methods, such
as experimentation and agent-based simulations. Empirical testing can offer the
opportunity for greater specificity, as well as provide experience with the decision
challenge.29
Game-theoretic assumptions about decision-making address the following
aspects of the incentives and motivations of hypothetical decision makers: decisions and the outcomes of decisions (e.g., the payoffs or the costs/benefits associated with decisions); decision makers’ knowledge about alternative choices;
their preferences for one decision over another, and the consistency of these
preferences; their knowledge about the decisions that other decision makers will
make, both preemptively and in response to their own choices; their beliefs or expectations about the likelihood of obtaining the payoffs associated with choices;
the rules they use to make a decision; and the bases on which they update their
knowledge about the state of play.
Game-theoretic analyses are based on a “rational” model of decision-making,
in the sense that the analysis of decision makers’ incentives and motivations is
based on the fundamental assumption that they are aware of their alternatives,
form expectations about unknowns, have clear preferences, and make choices
using some type of optimization process. Games can be designed to make the
decision challenge more interesting by introducing uncertainty and incomplete
or imperfect information. For example, a model may assume that players are uncertain about the objective parameters of the environment, imperfectly informed
about the events that unfold in a game, uncertain about the actions of other players, or uncertain about the reasoning of other players. However, rationality assumptions are maintained in the face of uncertainty and are resolved by assuming
that players determine the value of a choice on the basis of an estimated value of
a utility function with respect to a probability measure.
COMPARING METHODS
Wargaming, experimentation, and game-theoretic modeling—all are used to
analyze strategic decisions and interactions. However, they are very different
methods and have different strengths and weaknesses for analyzing war-fighting
decision challenges. Analysts using these methods to investigate war-fighting
decisions approach research design in ways that have profoundly different implications for achieving the Navy’s research and education objectives. Table 2, which
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON BASED ON MEASURES OF RIGOR
Internal
Validity

External
Validity

Reliability

Replicability

Wargaming

High

Medium

High

High

Experimentation

High

Low

High

High

Game theory

High

Low

High

High

Method

provides a side-by-side comparison of wargaming, experimentation, and game
theory against the standard measures of rigor discussed previously, shows that
no method provides perfect rigor, and it highlights the trade-offs associated with
using one method versus another.30 Game-theoretic modeling and experimentation have high internal validity, reliability, and replicability, but low external validity. This makes these methods good candidates for conducting rigorous basic
research on the effects of war-fighting decisions under tightly constrained conditions, but comparatively poor candidates for addressing research questions associated with less-constrained conditions, such as those associated with complex
adaptive systems or the intensity and fog of war. In contrast, wargaming has high
internal validity, reliability, and replicability, and its findings are more likely to be
useful for addressing relatively unconstrained war-fighting decision questions.
The estimates of rigor associated with each method listed in table 2 are based
on the potential of the method to generate findings in a rigorous way if research
is designed and executed properly. However, the potential of a method to generate rigorous findings does not guarantee the quality or usefulness of the research;
even the best researchers are not always able to meet standards for rigor, because
they may not have the data, tools, facilities, or funds they need at the time they
need them, or they may choose to sacrifice some analytical rigor to achieve other
objectives.
Another way to look at methodological selection is through the lens of the
purpose and objectives of research. Research purposes and objectives may include any of the following:
• Advancing general knowledge about decision-making in war fighting
• Recognizing decision points in war fighting, so as to fight more effectively
• Providing warfighters with the opportunity to rehearse decision-making in a
fight (e.g., to prepare themselves to fight, without actually fighting)
• Educating current and future warfighters by providing experience in the art
and science of decision-making in war fighting

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/6

NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 75

14

5/2/19 11:35 AM

76

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Polski: Back to Basics—Research Design for the Operational Level of War

When we consider the nature of many war-fighting research questions and
potential purposes and objectives, it suggests that we need a method that will
accommodate both fuzzy and formal logic. As with any requirements analysis, if
we are going to select a method properly to fit the nature of the war-fighting challenge and meet our purposes and objectives, we need a commonly understood
criterion. In research requirements analysis, this criterion is inferential value, or
the extent to which one can infer implications from research. However, inferential value is really a shorthand way of referring to two standard methodological
selection criteria: the extent to which the selected method will generate analytically rigorous findings (i.e., findings that are valid, reliable, and replicable) and
the feasibility of operationalizing and executing the method.
Table 3, which compares our selected decision-analytical methods on the
basis of four distinct purposes and objectives, shows that, once again, none of
the methods meets all our potential requirements, although wargaming and
experimentation meet most of them. Wargaming provides warfighters with an
opportunity to think deeply about the use of an operating concept, an operating plan, or a course of action, or to experience decision-making and the effects
of interaction with a determined adversary, whereas experimentation provides
researchers a means to analyze alternative concepts and capabilities empirically. However, wargaming and experimentation are not the best candidates for
research that aims to advance general knowledge of warfare. Yet while gametheoretic modeling is a strong method for obtaining rigorous insights into general classes of tightly constrained decision questions, it has limited use for addressing the kinds of decisions and decision environments that are typical in joint
warfare and combined arms. As Thomas C. Schelling observed when the military
reinvigorated mathematical modeling and simulation to address war-fighting
decisions in the Cold War era, when humans are in the loop it is impossible to
sustain rigid parameters; we can and do change the rules of the game as we play
and, more importantly, as we fight.31
TABLE 3
COMPARISON BASED ON PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
Objectives

Wargaming

Experimentation

Game Theory

Advance general knowledge of warfare

Weak

Weak

Strong

Recognize decision points

Strong

Strong

Weak

Rehearse decisions

Strong

Strong

Weak

Experience decisions

Strong

Strong

Weak
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Researchers understand that no method ever will allow them to achieve
perfect inference or analytical rigor—these are ideal standards, not minimum
thresholds. They also understand that their most interesting challenges, such as
fighting peer and near-peer adversaries in a global political and economic system
with four physical domains, are messy and difficult to investigate. This implies
that we must reconcile ourselves to trading some degree of inferential value and
rigor to make progress. For example, it may be difficult to find data that will
measure what we would like to measure, data may be difficult to clean for analysis because it is incomplete or corrupted, it may be difficult to mitigate bias in
data collection and analysis, we may not understand or be able to agree on how
to measure or interpret data, and we may not have the analytical capabilities or
tools we would like to have.
Wargaming, experimentation, and game theory have different but potentially
complementary strengths for investigating questions about war fighting at the
operational level. Wargaming is a research process that provides the opportunity
to experience and think through the implications of operational decisions and
to identify gaps and shortfalls in potential war-fighting operations. Similarly, experimentation is a disciplined and systematic investigatory process for isolating
and identifying associations and causal relationships among a range of variables.
When used to investigate war fighting, it may produce a range of useful findings with a relatively high degree of inferential value. Game theory can serve
both wargaming and experimentation by providing a framework for specifying
the structure of decision makers’ incentives and motivations in a potential warfighting operation, which is useful in designing, implementing, and interpreting
research findings.
However, when used on a stand-alone basis, wargaming, experimentation,
and game theory all have serious limitations as research methods for improving
the useful stock of knowledge about war fighting at the operational level. Each
method may produce biased results that can affect the validity and reliability of
findings. The technique most often recommended to strengthen the validity of a
research design is to use formal probability sampling of instances of units, treatments, observations, or settings. However, implementing this approach requires
both the existence of clearly delineated populations of each of these variables and
the ability to sample with known probability from within each of these populations. Even if this were possible in critical war-fighting research areas, formal
sampling methods usually offer only a limited solution to generalization issues.
TTCP suggests an alternative approach to improving the inferential value of
war-fighting research. It recommends using multiple research methods, integrating methods into a coherent and concerted research program, and using an
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iterative process of analysis.32 The Navy has an ongoing experiment that applies
this approach to exploring critical war-fighting decision issues.33 Beginning in
late 2014, the Navy began experimenting with integrating a number of different
research methods to explore the challenges associated with potential war-fighting
scenarios in the Pacific Fleet AOR. Figure 4 illustrates the Navy’s perspective on
integrated research. The aim of the project (still ongoing, on a classified basis) is
to develop concrete recommendations that can inform decisions about strategy,
concepts of operations, mission analyses, operation planning, campaign analyses, and resource allocation. The sponsor for the project is the fleet commander.
The analytical team includes the CNO’s strategy and planning staff (N3/N5), his
campaign analysis staff (N81), the fleet’s war-fighting assessments and readiness
staff (N9), and the NWC WGD.
Naval analysts are using the insights they have obtained from this research
program to inform ongoing modeling, simulation, development of CONOPSs,
mission analyses, and strategic thinking; to refine analytical agendas; and to
conduct further research. The team that originally organized and directed this
program of research characterized it as an innovation in decision analysis that has
required cultural and process changes. They believe they have demonstrated the
FIGURE 4
AN INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR OPERATIONAL WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH

Wargaming

Exercises

Experimentation

Modeling & Simulation

Source: Rear Adm. Patrick Piercey, USN, and David Yoshihara.
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value of linking and more tightly integrating operations analysis and research and
of basing operational and command decisions on findings that rely on multiple
research methods.
The team has offered the following recommendations, which have implications for designing and conducting research, education, and training.34
1.	 Begin with the end(s) in mind. Use a structured, systems approach to
identify opportunities to achieve actionable results, specify the context
for decision-making, generate objectives, and outline requirements. If
integrative analysis is something new in an organization, create a Skunk
Works, provide top cover, and communicate strategically.
2.	 Keep it simple. Research is time-consuming and costly; resist the tendency
to overspecify requirements, to focus on tools and technologies rather
than decisions and insights, and to include too many people. Do not be
afraid to slow things down to avoid “rushing off to failure.”
3.	 Facilitate collaboration. Build the infrastructure for collaboration into the
research design and integration process, and ensure that there is openness
and transparency among all associated staff members.
4.	 Understand what is required and delivered. The commander and analytical
staff need to have a good understanding of research methodologies and of
what is reasonably achievable. Manage expectations about the inferential
value of the research and how component projects will align within the
larger research program.
Professional research communities are rife with—and often thrive on—
controversy and professional jealousies. However, if senior Navy leaders wish to
optimize returns on investment in operations research, it would behoove them
to focus on the inferential value of research findings, be wary of provoking unproductive turf wars, and eschew searches for silver bullets and all-encompassing
methods. Researching complex system-of-system challenges such as war fighting
requires multiple methods, integrated research programs, and strict accountability to research criteria related to inference, intellectual merit, and broader
impacts.
There is no single operations research method that is demonstrably better
than any other method for advancing knowledge of operational-level warfare.
Every method has strengths and limitations in producing findings that can help
the Navy make decisions that will protect and successfully prosecute U.S. interests over the short, medium, and long terms.
To grapple more effectively with complexity and rapidly changing threat
environments, we need wargames and we need more, not less, senior leader
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engagement in these games. But these games must be designed and conducted
with an experimental mindset, integrated within a broader research program,
and informed by professional research practice, and researchers must be willing
to take on board advances in science, mathematics, and technologies. We can use
game theory to inform and refine operations research practices, but we cannot
use it to analyze contemporary or future policy, strategy, operational design, or
tactical challenges.
The history of the U.S. Navy is replete with examples of innovation in warfare
at the operational level. If senior leaders wish to innovate, they must focus their
attention and efforts on ensuring that decision-making in the Navy enterprise
is based on professionally vetted research, then hold the research enterprise to
these standards.

NOTES

1.	The call to innovate in the Department of
Defense began with Deputy Secretary Robert
O. Work’s memorandum dated February
9, 2015, available at news.usni.org/. In the
Navy, Secretary Ray Mabus issued a call to
innovate with his memorandum dated May 5,
2015, available at www.doncio.navy.mil/. For
reflections on the implications for research at
the Naval War College, see Thomas J. Culora,
“A War-Gaming Renaissance,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 142/5/1,359 (May 2016).
Similarly, see John Hanley’s call for change
in analysis and research in John T. Hanley Jr.,
“Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm: The
Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation,” Naval War College Review
70, no. 1 (Winter 2017), pp. 64–103. Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has emphasized the role of analysis and
research. John Richardson [Adm. USN], “A
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Version 2.0,” December 2018, available at
www.navy.mil/.
2.	Hanley proposes that we use game theory
to enhance operational wargaming practice. John T. Hanley Jr., “Planning for the
Kamikazes: Toward a Theory and Practice
of Repeated Operational Games,” Naval War
College Review 70, no. 2 (Spring 2017), pp.
29–48.
3.	With respect to wargaming, see, for example,
Hank J. Brightman and Melissa K. Dewey,
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“Trends in Modern War Gaming: The Art of
Conversation,” Naval War College Review 67,
no. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 17–30, and Culora,
“A War-Gaming Renaissance.” With respect
to game theory, see Thomas C. Schelling, The
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1960). For a more recent critique,
see, for example, Ariel Rubinstein, “Comments on Economic Models, Economics and
Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by
Dani Rodrik,” Journal of Economic Literature
55, no. 1 (March 2017), pp. 162–72.
4.	Government Accountability Office, Joint
Professional Military Education: Opportunities
Exist for Greater Oversight and Coordination
of Associated Research Institutions, GAO-14216 (Washington, DC: March 2014).
5.	See Jon Scott Logel and Margaret M. Polski,
2017 Navy Operations Analysis and Research
Workshop Final Report (Newport, RI: U.S.
Naval War College, December 29, 2017).
6.	Substantial portions of this article are based
on Margaret M. Polski, “A Warfighter’s Guide
to Analysis” (working paper WGD20181, War
Gaming Department, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, RI, April 2018), and Margaret M.
Polski and Jon Scott Logel, “Doing Analysis”
(working paper WGD20191, War Gaming
Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 2019).

19

5/2/19 11:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 6

7.	The Chief of Naval Operations and the other
service chiefs are charged under Title 10 of
the U.S. Code with providing policy advice;
organizing, manning, training, and equipping
the force; providing guidance for the development of doctrine, concepts, courses of action,
and standard operating policies and procedures; budgeting, research and development,
and capital investment; and building strategic
partnerships.
8.	U.S. Defense Dept., Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States, JP 1 (Washington,
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013,
incorporating change 1 of July 12, 2017), p.
I.A(3).
9.	The following sections are drawn from
Margaret M. Polski, “Extending the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
to Policy Analysis and Design,” chap. 2 in
Institutional Diversity in Self-governing Socie
ties, ed. Filippo Sabetti and Dario Castiglione
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), pp.
25–47.
10. Fuzzy logic is a means of classifying objects
or concepts that are inherently vague or difficult to categorize as either true or false. The
modern fuzzy logic concept and fuzzy logic
set theory are attributed to Lotfi A. Zahdeh.
For an accessible account of fuzzy logic, see
Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger, Fuzzy
Logic: The Revolutionary Computer Technology That Is Changing Our World (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1993).
11. Classic texts on the philosophy of science
include Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, Routledge Classics (Abingdon,
U.K.: Routledge, 2002), and Thomas S. Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962). For an
interesting analysis from a sociological perspective, see Randall Collins, The Sociology of
Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1998).
12. These definitions of validity, reliability, and
replicability are drawn from Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1994). Donald Campbell and Julian
Stanley, who are concerned with experimental design, distinguish internal validity from
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external validity. Findings have internal validity if we can state that the experimental treatment made a difference in a specific experimental instance. External validity refers to the
extent to which findings can be generalized
across other populations, settings, treatment
variables, and measurement variables. Donald
T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).
For a general primer on research design and
planning, see Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis
Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and
Design, 9th ed. (Harlow, Essex, U.K.: Pearson,
2010).
13. The proper spelling of wargaming is controversial. In McCarty Little’s and McHugh’s
published writings, the term was rendered as
war gaming (i.e., open). Today, however, other
than in the name of the War Gaming Department, the College uses the wargame/-er/-ing
spelling (i.e., closed up).
14. McCarty Little was appointed in 1887 as a
member of the faculty and developed twosided wargaming at the College. Brightman
and Dewey, “Trends in Modern War Gaming.” McHugh also credits McCarty Little
with introducing wargaming at the College.
See Francis J. McHugh, Fundamentals of War
Gaming, 3rd ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval
War College, 1966). McCarty Little’s publications on wargaming include Rules for the
Conduct of War Games (Newport, RI: Naval
War College, 1901, 1905), “The Strategic
Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 38/4/144 (1912),
and The Chart Maneuver (Newport, RI: Naval
War College, 1920).
15. Jon Scott Logel reports on Van Auken’s
appointment as director of the Research Department at the College and his team’s work
analyzing wargames in the interwar period.
See Jon Scott Logel, “Captain Van Auken
and the Research Department of the Naval
War College: Considerations of Analytical
War Gaming in the Decade before Midway”
(paper prepared for the 2017 McMullen
Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval
Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 14–15,
2017). Also see John M. Lillard, Playing War:
Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for
World War II (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska
Press, 2016), p. 100.
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16. McHugh’s influence is reflected in the current
edition of the College’s reference work on
the subject. Shawn Burns, ed., War Gamers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional
War Gamers (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War
College, [2015]), available at usnwc.edu/.
For a professional wargamer’s perspective on
McHugh’s influence, see David DellaVolpe’s
foreword.
17. McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming.
18. For detailed descriptions of wargaming methodology, see ibid., and Burns, War Gamers’
Handbook.
19. Wargamers have different ways of categorizing the structure of their wargames. Common
categories are one-sided, one-and-one-halfsided, two-sided, multisided, and red
teaming.
20. See Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook, for a
description of the process.
21. By replicate I mean that another equally
capable research team could analyze the data
from game play and obtain the same findings.
By repeat I mean that the same game design
could be played again by another research
team or the same research team with the same
players or another group of players. By iterate
I mean that a new game could be designed
and played that builds on previous findings to
extend the investigation of the war-fighting
challenge.
22. The Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC) manages and executes the Fleet
Experimentation program on behalf of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. For information, see “Navy Warfare Development Command,” America’s Navy, www.navy.mil/.
23. The following section draws on M. M. Polski,
“Technical Brief on Quasi-Experimental
Design” (paper prepared for the WG 30 Special
Session, “Are War Games Quasi-Experiments?,”
of the Military Operations Research Society’s
83rd Symposium, Alexandria, VA, June 23,
2015).
24. William Shadish, Thomas Cook, and Donald
Campbell identify five different types of
experiments: an experiment, a randomized
experiment, a quasi experiment, a natural
experiment, and a correlational study. They
also provide examples of the use of the
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experimental method across disciplines.
See William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook,
and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized
Causal Inference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
2001).
25. See Richard A. Kass, The Logic of Warfighting Experiments, Command and Control
Research Program Publication Series (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, 2006); the Technical Cooperation Program [hereafter TTCP], Guide for
Understanding and Implementing Defense
Experimentation [hereafter GUIDEx], ver. 1.1
(Ottowa: Canadian Forces Experimentation
Centre, February 2006); and NWDC, Experiment Planning Guide [hereafter EPG], 2017
ed.
26. See, for example, Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, and
Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: Univ.
of Michigan Press, 1994); John H. Kagel and
Alvin E. Roth, eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1995); Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G.
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist, 2nd ed. (New York: Open Univ. Press,
2010); John T. Cacioppo, Penny S. Visser, and
Cynthia L. Pickett, eds., Social Neuroscience:
People Thinking about Thinking People (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2006); and Dietrich Dörner,
The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding
Error in Complex Situations (New York: Basic
Books, 1997). Many empirical social scientists
conceptualize decision challenges using game
theory, then test these game-theoretic models
using experimental methods.
27. Kass, The Logic of Warfighting Experiments;
TTCP, GUIDEx; NWDC, EPG.
28. Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A
Course in Game Theory (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1994); John von Neumann, “Zur
Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele,” Mathe
matische Annalen 100 (1928), pp. 295–320;
John von Neumann, “Über ein ökonomisches
Gleichungssystem und eine Verallgemeine
rung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes,”
Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums
8 (1937), pp. 73–83; John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Prince
ton Univ. Press, 1944). In addition to von
Neumann and Morgenstern, classic texts
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include R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa,
Games and Decisions: Introduction and
Critical Survey (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1957);
Martin Shubik, Game Theory in the Social
Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1982); Hervé Moulin, Game
Theory for the Social Sciences (New York: New
York Univ. Press, 1986); Drew Fudenberg and
Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1991); Roger B. Myerson, Game
Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1991); and Kenneth G.
Binmore, Fun and Games: A Text on Game
Theory (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1992).
29. Game-theoretic analyses are used extensively
in institutional political economy, experimental economics, and computational social
science. See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner,
and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool
Resources; Kagel and Roth, The Handbook
of Experimental Economics; Robert H. Bates
et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1998); and Gilbert and
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist.
30. For an alternative but complementary approach to analyzing and comparing methods,
see Paul K. Davis, Analysis to Inform Defense
Planning despite Austerity (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2014), and Paul K. Davis and
Amy Henninger, Analysis, Analysis Practices,
and Implications for Modeling and Simulation
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).
31. For an early critique of game-theoretic analyses, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict,
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chap. 4. Also see Thomas C. Schelling,
“The Role of War Games and Exercises,” in
Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B.
Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A.
Zraket (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), and Thomas C. Schelling, “Red
vs. Blue” (paper presented at a wargaming
conference organized by the National Defense
Univ. at U.S. Marine Headquarters, Quantico,
VA, August 2015). Schelling is often—and
wrongly—described as a game theorist. In a
conversation with him in September 2014, I
asked about this identification. He told me
that he had never worked with game theory,
but that he thought some of its organizing
ideas were useful for thinking systematically
about strategic interaction.
32. TTCP, GUIDEx contains fourteen principles
for designing defense research; five of them
(nos. 4–7 and 10) are related to integrating
and leveraging multiple operations research
methods.
33. This section is based on Margaret M. Polski,
“The Navy’s Experience with Integrative
Decision Analysis” (unclassified case
study prepared for the Military Operations
Research Society wargaming community of
practice) and classified cross-game studies
the author conducted in July 2017, December
2017, August 2018, and November 2018 for
the CNO.
34. Polski, “The Navy’s Experience wth Integrative Decision Analysis.”
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